Reject symlinked privacy paths
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@@ -103,6 +103,9 @@ Each bounded iteration must:
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- [x] X11-feature tests pass: 24 tests, including rejection of `None` and
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`PointerRoot` as paste targets (plus Docker GTK/X11/package build,
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2026-09-12).
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- [x] Reject symlinked config and database paths before reads, permission
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changes, or SQLite opens (27 X11-feature tests and Docker GTK/X11/package
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build, 2026-09-12).
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- [x] Rust formatting check passes on 2026-09-10.
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- [x] X11-only cargo check passes on 2026-09-10.
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- [x] Full GTK/X11 build passes in the declared Docker environment (Docker build, 2026-09-10).
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@@ -121,5 +124,7 @@ Each bounded iteration must:
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real application-target acceptance remains manual evidence.
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- Diagnostics previously printed a fixed log filename even though the rolling
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logger creates date-suffixed files; this is now reported as the log directory.
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- Path hardening rejects final-file symlinks; parent-directory symlink,
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ownership, and no-follow atomic-open guarantees remain future hardening.
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- The initial implementation is now committed; future work must keep the tree
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clean at each checkpoint.
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@@ -36,8 +36,21 @@ impl Config {
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}
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pub fn load_or_default() -> Result<Self> {
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let path = Self::path();
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if !path.exists() {
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return Ok(Self::default());
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match fs::symlink_metadata(&path) {
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Ok(metadata) if metadata.file_type().is_symlink() => {
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anyhow::bail!(
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"refusing to read symlinked configuration {}",
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path.display()
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)
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}
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Ok(_) => {}
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Err(error) if error.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => {
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return Ok(Self::default())
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}
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Err(error) => {
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return Err(error)
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.with_context(|| format!("failed to inspect configuration {}", path.display()))
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}
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}
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if let Some(parent) = path.parent() {
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fs::set_permissions(parent, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o700)).with_context(|| {
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@@ -25,6 +25,13 @@ impl Database {
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pub fn open(path: impl AsRef<Path>) -> Result<Self> {
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let path = path.as_ref().to_path_buf();
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if let Ok(metadata) = std::fs::symlink_metadata(&path) {
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anyhow::ensure!(
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!metadata.file_type().is_symlink(),
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"refusing to open symlinked database {}",
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path.display()
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);
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}
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if let Some(parent) = path.parent() {
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std::fs::create_dir_all(parent).with_context(|| {
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format!("failed to create database directory {}", parent.display())
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@@ -234,6 +241,24 @@ mod tests {
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let _ = std::fs::remove_file(path);
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}
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#[test]
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fn refuses_symlinked_database_path() {
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let directory =
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std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("clipbhoard-symlink-{}", std::process::id()));
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let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&directory);
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let target = directory.with_extension("target");
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let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&target);
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std::fs::write(&target, "not a database").unwrap();
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std::os::unix::fs::symlink(&target, &directory).unwrap();
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let error = match Database::open(&directory) {
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Ok(_) => panic!("symlinked database was opened"),
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Err(error) => error.to_string(),
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};
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assert!(error.contains("symlinked database"));
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let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&directory);
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let _ = std::fs::remove_file(target);
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}
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#[test]
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fn trimming_keeps_pinned_entries_and_newest_unpinned_entries() {
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let db = Database::open("file:clipbhoard-trim?mode=memory&cache=shared").unwrap();
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