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1 Commits
fix/usage-
...
fix/servic
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
|
0328768396 |
1
changelog.d/fixes/services-ws-proxy-auth.md
Normal file
1
changelog.d/fixes/services-ws-proxy-auth.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
- **fix(security):** the embedded-services WebSocket proxy now authorizes every upgrade like the HTTP embed route (loopback peer, dashboard Origin, dashboard session or management-scope key) before it opens a tunnel with the service credential, and service bootstrap no longer starts a service with a fallback credential when its key cannot be loaded
|
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@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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- Return the shared provider accounts in the usage command JSON (`?format=json`) only to keys with `self:account-quota` or a management scope, the same rule `/v1/me/status` uses; other keys get their personal quota only (thanks @Witroch4).
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@@ -624,7 +624,12 @@ This proxy:
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- Rewrites HTML responses to inject `<base href>` and normalize absolute paths (`/foo` → `/dashboard/.../embed/foo`)
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WebSocket upgrades for the embedded dashboard are handled by a companion server on a
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dedicated port (see `src/lib/services/embedWsProxy.ts`).
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dedicated port (see `src/lib/services/embedWsProxy.ts`). Every upgrade is authorized
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before the tunnel opens, with the same rules as the HTTP embed route: the peer must be
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loopback with no reverse-proxy forwarding header, a browser `Origin` must be a dashboard
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origin (`LIVE_WS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS` / `LIVE_WS_ALLOWED_HOSTS` extend the loopback
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defaults), and the caller needs a dashboard session or a management-scope API key unless
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dashboard login is disabled.
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**Security:** The embed proxy routes are classified under `LOCAL_ONLY_API_PREFIXES`
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and can only be reached from loopback. An attacker who obtains a JWT via a
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@@ -186,6 +186,23 @@ function buildSpawnArgsFactory(
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return () => cliproxySpawnArgs(cfg.port, apiKey);
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}
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/**
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* The service's own credential (API key / admin token), "" when it needs none,
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* or null when it cannot be loaded. A null key means the service is not started:
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* a guessable stand-in would be worse than no service, and the on-demand
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* /api/services/<tool>/* path reports the key error to the operator.
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||||
*/
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async function loadServiceApiKey(cfg: ServiceEntry): Promise<string | null> {
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if (!cfg.needsApiKey) return "";
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try {
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return await getOrCreateApiKey(cfg.tool);
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} catch (err: unknown) {
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const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
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console.warn(`[Services] Not supervising ${cfg.tool}: its API key is unavailable. ${msg}`);
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return null;
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}
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}
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export async function bootstrapEmbeddedServices(): Promise<void> {
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for (const cfg of SERVICES) {
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if (getSupervisor(cfg.tool)) continue;
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@@ -193,9 +210,8 @@ export async function bootstrapEmbeddedServices(): Promise<void> {
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const row = await getVersionManagerTool(cfg.tool);
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if (!row || row.status === "not_installed") continue;
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|
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const apiKey = cfg.needsApiKey
|
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? await getOrCreateApiKey(cfg.tool).catch(() => "placeholder")
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: "";
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const apiKey = await loadServiceApiKey(cfg);
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if (apiKey === null) continue;
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// CLIProxyAPI's generated key is management-only; /v1/models uses its dedicated data-plane key.
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const modelSyncApiKey =
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cfg.tool === "cliproxy"
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@@ -13,8 +13,15 @@
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* - Target host is always 127.0.0.1 and port comes from the registry — never
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* from user input. No SSRF risk.
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* - Server binds to 127.0.0.1 only (loopback) unless EMBED_WS_PROXY_HOST
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* is set explicitly. The OmniRoute LOCAL_ONLY rule is enforced at the
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* dashboard layer; the proxy itself is loopback-only as defence-in-depth.
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* (or LIVE_WS_HOST) is set explicitly.
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* - Every upgrade is authorized before the tunnel opens
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* (authorizeEmbedWsUpgrade), with the same decision as the HTTP embed route
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* (LOCAL_ONLY + management auth, Hard Rule #17): the TCP peer must be
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* loopback with no reverse-proxy hop header, a browser Origin must be one of
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* the dashboard origins, and the caller must hold a dashboard session or a
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* management-scope API key (unless dashboard login is disabled). A rejected
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* upgrade never reaches the service, so the injected service credential is
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* only ever sent on behalf of an authorized caller. Errors fail closed.
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* - Max 50 concurrent connections per service. The 51st request receives 503.
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* - Idle timeout: 5 minutes without any data → both sockets are destroyed.
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* - Hop-by-hop headers cookie/authorization/origin are stripped from the
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@@ -27,6 +34,13 @@ import type { IncomingMessage } from "node:http";
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import { getSupervisor } from "./registry";
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import { getOrCreateApiKey } from "./apiKey";
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import { getApiKeyMetadata } from "@/lib/db/apiKeys";
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import { hasProxyHopHeader } from "@/server/authz/proxyHeaders";
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import { isLoopbackHost } from "@/server/authz/routeGuard";
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import { isOriginAllowed } from "@/server/ws/liveServerAllowList";
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import { hasManageScope } from "@/shared/constants/managementScopes";
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import { isAuthRequired, isDashboardSessionAuthenticated } from "@/shared/utils/apiAuth";
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import { extractApiKey, isValidApiKey } from "@/sse/services/auth";
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import {
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attachRequestStreamGuards,
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installProcessCrashGuard,
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@@ -129,7 +143,96 @@ function buildUpstreamHeaders(rawHeaders: string[], port: number, apiKey: string
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return lines;
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}
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export type EmbedWsUpgradeVerdict =
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| { allow: true; via: "anonymous" | "dashboard_session" | "management_key" }
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| { allow: false; status: number; message: string };
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function deny(status: number, message: string): EmbedWsUpgradeVerdict {
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return { allow: false, status, message };
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}
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/** True when the upgrade's real TCP peer is this machine and no proxy hop relayed it. */
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function isLocalUpgradePeer(req: IncomingMessage): boolean {
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if (hasProxyHopHeader(req.headers)) return false;
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return isLoopbackHost(req.socket?.remoteAddress ?? null);
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}
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/**
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* A browser always sends Origin on a WebSocket upgrade; it must be one of the
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* dashboard origins (same allow-list as the Live dashboard socket:
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* LIVE_WS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS / LIVE_WS_ALLOWED_HOSTS on top of the loopback
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* defaults). A client without Origin is not a browser page; it still has to be
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* local and authenticated.
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*/
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function isUpgradeOriginAllowed(origin: string | string[] | undefined): boolean {
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if (origin === undefined) return true;
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if (typeof origin !== "string" || origin.length === 0) return false;
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return isOriginAllowed(origin, process.env);
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}
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function toHeaders(headers: IncomingMessage["headers"]): Headers {
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const out = new Headers();
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for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {
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if (typeof value === "string") out.set(name, value);
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else if (Array.isArray(value)) {
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out.set(name, value.join(name.toLowerCase() === "cookie" ? "; " : ", "));
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}
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}
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return out;
|
||||
}
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/**
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* Decide whether an upgrade may open a tunnel. Mirrors the management policy the
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* HTTP embed route (`/dashboard/providers/services/<name>/embed/`) goes through:
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* loopback only, then anonymous when dashboard login is off, otherwise a
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* dashboard session or an API key with a management scope. Header-only
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* credentials; a URL-borne token never counts.
|
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*/
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export async function authorizeEmbedWsUpgrade(
|
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req: IncomingMessage
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): Promise<EmbedWsUpgradeVerdict> {
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if (!isLocalUpgradePeer(req)) {
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return deny(403, "The embedded service WebSocket proxy only accepts local connections");
|
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}
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if (!isUpgradeOriginAllowed(req.headers.origin)) {
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return deny(403, "Origin not allowed");
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}
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const authRequest = {
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url: "http://127.0.0.1/dashboard/providers/services/embed-ws",
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method: "GET",
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headers: toHeaders(req.headers),
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};
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try {
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if (!(await isAuthRequired(authRequest, { loopback: true }))) {
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return { allow: true, via: "anonymous" };
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}
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if (await isDashboardSessionAuthenticated(authRequest)) {
|
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return { allow: true, via: "dashboard_session" };
|
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}
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const apiKey = extractApiKey(authRequest, { allowUrl: false });
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if (apiKey && (await isValidApiKey(apiKey))) {
|
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const meta = await getApiKeyMetadata(apiKey);
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if (meta && hasManageScope(meta.scopes ?? [])) {
|
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return { allow: true, via: "management_key" };
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}
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}
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return apiKey ? deny(403, "Invalid management token") : deny(401, "Authentication required");
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} catch {
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return deny(503, "Authentication backend unavailable");
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}
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}
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async function proxyUpgrade(req: IncomingMessage, socket: net.Socket, head: Buffer): Promise<void> {
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// Authorize before anything else: an unauthorized caller learns nothing about
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// the registered services and never gets a tunnel carrying the service key.
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const verdict = await authorizeEmbedWsUpgrade(req);
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if (!verdict.allow) {
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writeError(socket, verdict.status, verdict.message);
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return;
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}
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const rawUrl = req.url ?? "/";
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const match = PATH_RE.exec(rawUrl.split("?")[0]);
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@@ -245,13 +348,13 @@ export function resolveEmbedWsHost(): string {
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* Start the embed WebSocket proxy server.
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* Idempotent — safe to call multiple times.
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*/
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export function initEmbedWsProxy(): void {
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export function initEmbedWsProxy(): http.Server | undefined {
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// Safety net: a client aborting a connection can emit `Error: aborted`/
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// ECONNRESET on the request stream; without this the single missed listener
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// becomes an uncaughtException that kills the server. Benign aborts are
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||||
// swallowed; genuine errors still crash loudly (#fix-dev-server-aborted).
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installProcessCrashGuard();
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if (globalThis.__omnirouteEmbedWsStarted) return;
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if (globalThis.__omnirouteEmbedWsStarted) return undefined;
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|
||||
const host = resolveEmbedWsHost();
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const port = parseInt(process.env.EMBED_WS_PROXY_PORT ?? String(DEFAULT_PORT), 10);
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@@ -284,6 +387,8 @@ export function initEmbedWsProxy(): void {
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globalThis.__omnirouteEmbedWsStarted = true;
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console.log(`[EmbedWsProxy] Listening on ${host}:${port}`);
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});
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return server;
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}
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|
||||
// ─── Exported for testing ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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@@ -4,8 +4,6 @@ import {
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||||
type ApiKeyUsageLimitStatus,
|
||||
} from "@/lib/usage/apiKeyUsageLimits";
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import { buildErrorBody } from "@omniroute/open-sse/utils/error";
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import { hasManageScope } from "@/shared/constants/managementScopes";
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import { hasSelfAccountQuotaScope } from "@/shared/constants/selfServiceScopes";
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export const INTERNAL_USAGE_COMMAND = "@@om-usage";
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export const USAGE_COMMAND_DISABLED_MESSAGE = "Usage command is disabled for this API key.";
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@@ -25,21 +23,6 @@ export interface UsageCommandApiKeyMetadata {
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dailyUsageLimitUsd?: number | null;
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weeklyUsageLimitUsd?: number | null;
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||||
fiveHourUsageLimitUsd?: number | null;
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||||
scopes?: string[] | null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The shared provider accounts behind a key (plan, raw quota windows, reset
|
||||
* times, connection ids) are operator data, not the key holder's. Only a key
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||||
* explicitly granted `self:account-quota` (the same scope that gates
|
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* `accountQuotas` on /v1/me/status) or a management key may read them; any other
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* key gets its own personal quota and nothing else. Missing scopes fail closed.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export function canReadSharedAccountQuota(scopes: readonly string[] | null | undefined): boolean {
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const list = Array.isArray(scopes)
|
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? scopes.filter((s): s is string => typeof s === "string")
|
||||
: [];
|
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return hasSelfAccountQuotaScope(list) || hasManageScope(list);
|
||||
}
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||||
|
||||
interface ProviderConnectionLike {
|
||||
@@ -564,9 +547,7 @@ function appendQuotaBlock(
|
||||
* NOTE on percentage semantics (#15530):
|
||||
* - JSON `provider.quotas` and `providers[].quotas` expose raw upstream
|
||||
* snapshots (unadjusted usage and remaining numbers/percentages), alongside
|
||||
* connection-level `quotaWindowThresholds` — ONLY to keys allowed to read the
|
||||
* shared accounts ({@link canReadSharedAccountQuota}). Every other key gets
|
||||
* `provider: null` and `providers: []`.
|
||||
* connection-level `quotaWindowThresholds`.
|
||||
* - In contrast, text output (`buildUsageCommandText` / terminal `@@om-usage`)
|
||||
* renders cutoff-adjusted remaining percentages (`NN% left`) via
|
||||
* {@link effectiveRemainingPercent}, where the configured cutoff reserve
|
||||
@@ -610,9 +591,6 @@ export async function buildUsageCommandJson(
|
||||
{ now: resolvedDeps.now }
|
||||
)
|
||||
: null;
|
||||
if (!canReadSharedAccountQuota(metadata.scopes)) {
|
||||
return { allowed: true, personal, provider: null, providers: [] };
|
||||
}
|
||||
const snapshots = await collectUsageSnapshots(metadata, resolvedDeps);
|
||||
const provider = selectUsageSnapshot(snapshots, selection);
|
||||
return { allowed: true, personal, provider, providers: snapshots };
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* bootstrapEmbeddedServices must not supervise a service whose API key cannot be
|
||||
* loaded. The key is the service's own credential (9router API key, Mux auth token,
|
||||
* Dario admin token, ...): starting the service with a fixed fallback string would hand
|
||||
* it a credential anyone can guess. The service is skipped instead; the on-demand
|
||||
* /api/services/<name>/* path then surfaces the key error to the operator.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
import { after, before, test } from "node:test";
|
||||
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
|
||||
import fs from "node:fs";
|
||||
import os from "node:os";
|
||||
import path from "node:path";
|
||||
|
||||
const ORIGINAL_STORAGE_KEY = process.env.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY;
|
||||
const ORIGINAL_DATA_DIR = process.env.DATA_DIR;
|
||||
// Own database directory: another test file may share the inherited DATA_DIR.
|
||||
const TEST_DATA_DIR = fs.mkdtempSync(
|
||||
path.join(process.env.DATA_DIR || os.tmpdir(), "bootstrap-service-key-")
|
||||
);
|
||||
process.env.DATA_DIR = TEST_DATA_DIR;
|
||||
// Without a storage key an encrypted column cannot be decrypted, which is the
|
||||
// degraded state this test needs.
|
||||
delete process.env.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY;
|
||||
|
||||
const core = await import("../../../src/lib/db/core.ts");
|
||||
const { upsertVersionManagerTool } = await import("../../../src/lib/db/versionManager.ts");
|
||||
const { getSupervisor, unregisterSupervisor } =
|
||||
await import("../../../src/lib/services/registry.ts");
|
||||
const { bootstrapEmbeddedServices } = await import("../../../src/lib/services/bootstrap.ts");
|
||||
|
||||
before(() => {
|
||||
core.resetDbInstance();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
after(() => {
|
||||
unregisterSupervisor("mux");
|
||||
unregisterSupervisor("9router");
|
||||
core.resetDbInstance();
|
||||
fs.rmSync(TEST_DATA_DIR, { recursive: true, force: true });
|
||||
if (ORIGINAL_DATA_DIR === undefined) delete process.env.DATA_DIR;
|
||||
else process.env.DATA_DIR = ORIGINAL_DATA_DIR;
|
||||
if (ORIGINAL_STORAGE_KEY === undefined) delete process.env.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY;
|
||||
else process.env.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY = ORIGINAL_STORAGE_KEY;
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a service whose stored key cannot be decrypted is not supervised", async () => {
|
||||
// Installed, not auto-started, with an encrypted key that cannot be read back.
|
||||
await upsertVersionManagerTool({
|
||||
tool: "mux",
|
||||
status: "installed",
|
||||
autoStart: false,
|
||||
apiKey: "enc:v1:00:00:00",
|
||||
});
|
||||
// A healthy service next to it keeps working.
|
||||
await upsertVersionManagerTool({ tool: "9router", status: "installed", autoStart: false });
|
||||
|
||||
await bootstrapEmbeddedServices();
|
||||
|
||||
assert.equal(getSupervisor("mux"), null, "mux must not run with a fallback credential");
|
||||
assert.notEqual(getSupervisor("9router"), null, "services with a readable key still register");
|
||||
});
|
||||
329
tests/unit/services/embedWsProxy-upgrade-auth.test.ts
Normal file
329
tests/unit/services/embedWsProxy-upgrade-auth.test.ts
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,329 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The embedded-services WebSocket proxy (initEmbedWsProxy, default :20131) tunnels a
|
||||
* client into an embedded service and adds that service's own Authorization header to
|
||||
* the tunnel. It must therefore apply the same decision as the HTTP embed route
|
||||
* (`/dashboard/providers/services/<name>/embed/`, LOCAL_ONLY + management auth) before
|
||||
* it opens the tunnel:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* - the TCP peer is loopback and no reverse-proxy hop header is present;
|
||||
* - a browser Origin, when sent, is one of the dashboard origins;
|
||||
* - the caller holds a dashboard session or a management-scope API key, unless the
|
||||
* dashboard itself runs without login (then loopback + Origin is the same bar the
|
||||
* HTTP embed route applies).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* A rejected upgrade never reaches the upstream service, so the service credential is
|
||||
* never sent for an unauthorized caller.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The test drives the real server (initEmbedWsProxy) over TCP against a fake upstream
|
||||
* that records what it receives.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
import { after, before, describe, test } from "node:test";
|
||||
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
|
||||
import fs from "node:fs";
|
||||
import net from "node:net";
|
||||
import os from "node:os";
|
||||
import path from "node:path";
|
||||
|
||||
import { createManagementSessionToken } from "../../helpers/managementSession.ts";
|
||||
|
||||
const ENV_KEYS = [
|
||||
"DATA_DIR",
|
||||
"JWT_SECRET",
|
||||
"API_KEY_SECRET",
|
||||
"OMNIROUTE_API_KEY",
|
||||
"ROUTER_API_KEY",
|
||||
"INITIAL_PASSWORD",
|
||||
"EMBED_WS_PROXY_HOST",
|
||||
"EMBED_WS_PROXY_PORT",
|
||||
"LIVE_WS_HOST",
|
||||
"LIVE_WS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS",
|
||||
"LIVE_WS_ALLOWED_HOSTS",
|
||||
"PORT",
|
||||
"DASHBOARD_PORT",
|
||||
] as const;
|
||||
const ORIGINAL_ENV = Object.fromEntries(ENV_KEYS.map((k) => [k, process.env[k]]));
|
||||
|
||||
function getFreePort(): Promise<number> {
|
||||
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
|
||||
const srv = net.createServer();
|
||||
srv.once("error", reject);
|
||||
srv.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", () => {
|
||||
const addr = srv.address();
|
||||
const port = addr && typeof addr === "object" ? addr.port : null;
|
||||
srv.close(() => (port ? resolve(port) : reject(new Error("no port"))));
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const PROXY_PORT = await getFreePort();
|
||||
|
||||
// Own database directory: another test file may share the inherited DATA_DIR.
|
||||
const TEST_DATA_DIR = fs.mkdtempSync(
|
||||
path.join(process.env.DATA_DIR || os.tmpdir(), "embed-ws-upgrade-auth-")
|
||||
);
|
||||
process.env.DATA_DIR = TEST_DATA_DIR;
|
||||
|
||||
process.env.JWT_SECRET = "test-jwt-secret-embed-ws-upgrade-auth";
|
||||
process.env.API_KEY_SECRET = "test-api-key-secret-embed-ws-upgrade-auth";
|
||||
// The env master key is materialised with `manage` scope — keep it out of the matrix.
|
||||
delete process.env.OMNIROUTE_API_KEY;
|
||||
delete process.env.ROUTER_API_KEY;
|
||||
delete process.env.INITIAL_PASSWORD;
|
||||
delete process.env.LIVE_WS_HOST;
|
||||
delete process.env.LIVE_WS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS;
|
||||
delete process.env.LIVE_WS_ALLOWED_HOSTS;
|
||||
delete process.env.PORT;
|
||||
delete process.env.DASHBOARD_PORT;
|
||||
// Bind every interface so the test can also reach the proxy from a non-loopback
|
||||
// address of this machine (the documented LIVE_WS_HOST=0.0.0.0 exposure).
|
||||
process.env.EMBED_WS_PROXY_HOST = "0.0.0.0";
|
||||
process.env.EMBED_WS_PROXY_PORT = String(PROXY_PORT);
|
||||
|
||||
const core = await import("../../../src/lib/db/core.ts");
|
||||
const apiKeysDb = await import("../../../src/lib/db/apiKeys.ts");
|
||||
const { updateSettings } = await import("../../../src/lib/db/settings.ts");
|
||||
const { upsertVersionManagerTool } = await import("../../../src/lib/db/versionManager.ts");
|
||||
const { getOrCreateApiKey } = await import("../../../src/lib/services/apiKey.ts");
|
||||
const { registerSupervisor, unregisterSupervisor } =
|
||||
await import("../../../src/lib/services/registry.ts");
|
||||
const embedWsProxy = await import("../../../src/lib/services/embedWsProxy.ts");
|
||||
|
||||
const DASHBOARD_ORIGIN = "http://127.0.0.1:20128";
|
||||
const FOREIGN_ORIGIN = "https://attacker.example";
|
||||
|
||||
/** First non-internal IPv4 address of this machine, if any. */
|
||||
function lanAddress(): string | null {
|
||||
for (const list of Object.values(os.networkInterfaces())) {
|
||||
for (const iface of list ?? []) {
|
||||
if (iface.family === "IPv4" && !iface.internal) return iface.address;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ── fake upstream service ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
const upstreamRequests: string[] = [];
|
||||
const upstream = net.createServer((sock) => {
|
||||
let buf = "";
|
||||
let answered = false;
|
||||
sock.on("data", (chunk) => {
|
||||
buf += chunk.toString("latin1");
|
||||
if (!answered && buf.includes("\r\n\r\n")) {
|
||||
answered = true;
|
||||
upstreamRequests.push(buf);
|
||||
sock.write(
|
||||
"HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols\r\nUpgrade: websocket\r\nConnection: Upgrade\r\n\r\n"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
sock.on("error", () => {});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Send a raw WebSocket upgrade for /9router/ws to the proxy and resolve with the
|
||||
* response status code (0 when the connection closed without a status line).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function attemptUpgrade(host: string, extraHeaders: Record<string, string> = {}): Promise<number> {
|
||||
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
|
||||
const sock = net.connect(PROXY_PORT, host);
|
||||
let buf = "";
|
||||
const timer = setTimeout(() => {
|
||||
sock.destroy();
|
||||
reject(new Error("timed out waiting for the upgrade response"));
|
||||
}, 8000);
|
||||
const finish = () => {
|
||||
clearTimeout(timer);
|
||||
const m = /^HTTP\/1\.1 (\d{3})/.exec(buf);
|
||||
sock.destroy();
|
||||
resolve(m ? Number(m[1]) : 0);
|
||||
};
|
||||
sock.on("connect", () => {
|
||||
const lines = [
|
||||
"GET /9router/ws HTTP/1.1",
|
||||
`Host: ${host}:${PROXY_PORT}`,
|
||||
"Connection: Upgrade",
|
||||
"Upgrade: websocket",
|
||||
"Sec-WebSocket-Version: 13",
|
||||
"Sec-WebSocket-Key: dGhlIHNhbXBsZSBub25jZQ==",
|
||||
...Object.entries(extraHeaders).map(([k, v]) => `${k}: ${v}`),
|
||||
];
|
||||
sock.write(`${lines.join("\r\n")}\r\n\r\n`);
|
||||
});
|
||||
sock.on("data", (chunk) => {
|
||||
buf += chunk.toString("latin1");
|
||||
if (buf.includes("\r\n\r\n")) finish();
|
||||
});
|
||||
sock.on("close", finish);
|
||||
sock.on("error", () => {});
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Run one upgrade and report the status plus how many requests reached upstream. */
|
||||
async function probe(host: string, headers: Record<string, string> = {}) {
|
||||
const before = upstreamRequests.length;
|
||||
const status = await attemptUpgrade(host, headers);
|
||||
const forwarded = upstreamRequests.slice(before);
|
||||
return { status, forwarded };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async function waitForProxy(): Promise<void> {
|
||||
const deadline = Date.now() + 10_000;
|
||||
while (!globalThis.__omnirouteEmbedWsStarted) {
|
||||
if (Date.now() > deadline) throw new Error("embed WS proxy did not start");
|
||||
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 20));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let proxyServer: { close: (cb?: () => void) => unknown } | undefined;
|
||||
let serviceKey = "";
|
||||
let manageKey = "";
|
||||
let readKey = "";
|
||||
let sessionCookie = "";
|
||||
|
||||
before(async () => {
|
||||
core.resetDbInstance();
|
||||
await new Promise<void>((resolve) => upstream.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", () => resolve()));
|
||||
const upstreamPort = (upstream.address() as net.AddressInfo).port;
|
||||
|
||||
await upsertVersionManagerTool({ tool: "9router", status: "installed", port: upstreamPort });
|
||||
serviceKey = await getOrCreateApiKey("9router");
|
||||
registerSupervisor({
|
||||
getStatus: () => ({
|
||||
tool: "9router",
|
||||
state: "running",
|
||||
port: upstreamPort,
|
||||
pid: null,
|
||||
health: "healthy",
|
||||
startedAt: null,
|
||||
lastError: null,
|
||||
}),
|
||||
} as never);
|
||||
|
||||
manageKey = (await apiKeysDb.createApiKey("operator", "machine-embed-ws", ["manage"])).key;
|
||||
readKey = (await apiKeysDb.createApiKey("inference", "machine-embed-ws", ["read"])).key;
|
||||
sessionCookie = `auth_token=${await createManagementSessionToken()}`;
|
||||
|
||||
globalThis.__omnirouteEmbedWsStarted = undefined;
|
||||
proxyServer = embedWsProxy.initEmbedWsProxy() as typeof proxyServer;
|
||||
await waitForProxy();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
after(async () => {
|
||||
unregisterSupervisor("9router");
|
||||
await new Promise<void>((resolve) => upstream.close(() => resolve()));
|
||||
if (proxyServer) await new Promise<void>((resolve) => proxyServer!.close(() => resolve()));
|
||||
globalThis.__omnirouteEmbedWsStarted = undefined;
|
||||
core.resetDbInstance();
|
||||
fs.rmSync(TEST_DATA_DIR, { recursive: true, force: true });
|
||||
for (const k of ENV_KEYS) {
|
||||
if (ORIGINAL_ENV[k] === undefined) delete process.env[k];
|
||||
else process.env[k] = ORIGINAL_ENV[k];
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("embed WS proxy — login required", () => {
|
||||
before(async () => {
|
||||
await updateSettings({ requireLogin: true, password: "hashed-password-for-test" });
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("an upgrade without any credential is rejected and never reaches the service", async () => {
|
||||
const { status, forwarded } = await probe("127.0.0.1", { Origin: DASHBOARD_ORIGIN });
|
||||
assert.equal(status, 401);
|
||||
assert.equal(forwarded.length, 0, "the service must not see the upgrade");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("an API key without a management scope is rejected", async () => {
|
||||
const { status, forwarded } = await probe("127.0.0.1", {
|
||||
Origin: DASHBOARD_ORIGIN,
|
||||
Authorization: `Bearer ${readKey}`,
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.equal(status, 403);
|
||||
assert.equal(forwarded.length, 0);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a management key opens the tunnel and only the service credential is forwarded", async () => {
|
||||
const { status, forwarded } = await probe("127.0.0.1", {
|
||||
Origin: DASHBOARD_ORIGIN,
|
||||
Authorization: `Bearer ${manageKey}`,
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.equal(status, 101);
|
||||
assert.equal(forwarded.length, 1);
|
||||
const sent = forwarded[0];
|
||||
assert.match(sent, new RegExp(`\\r\\nAuthorization: Bearer ${serviceKey}\\r\\n`));
|
||||
assert.ok(!sent.includes(manageKey), "the caller's own key must not reach the service");
|
||||
assert.ok(!/\r\norigin:/i.test(sent), "Origin is not forwarded");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a dashboard session cookie opens the tunnel and the cookie is not forwarded", async () => {
|
||||
const { status, forwarded } = await probe("127.0.0.1", {
|
||||
Origin: DASHBOARD_ORIGIN,
|
||||
Cookie: sessionCookie,
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.equal(status, 101);
|
||||
assert.equal(forwarded.length, 1);
|
||||
assert.ok(!/\r\ncookie:/i.test(forwarded[0]));
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a foreign Origin is rejected even with a valid management key", async () => {
|
||||
const { status, forwarded } = await probe("127.0.0.1", {
|
||||
Origin: FOREIGN_ORIGIN,
|
||||
Authorization: `Bearer ${manageKey}`,
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.equal(status, 403);
|
||||
assert.equal(forwarded.length, 0);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a request relayed by a reverse proxy is not treated as local", async () => {
|
||||
const { status, forwarded } = await probe("127.0.0.1", {
|
||||
Origin: DASHBOARD_ORIGIN,
|
||||
Authorization: `Bearer ${manageKey}`,
|
||||
"X-Forwarded-For": "203.0.113.9",
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.equal(status, 403);
|
||||
assert.equal(forwarded.length, 0);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a non-loopback peer is rejected even with a valid management key", async (t) => {
|
||||
const lan = lanAddress();
|
||||
if (!lan) {
|
||||
t.skip("no non-loopback IPv4 interface on this machine");
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
const { status, forwarded } = await probe(lan, {
|
||||
Origin: DASHBOARD_ORIGIN,
|
||||
Authorization: `Bearer ${manageKey}`,
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.equal(status, 403);
|
||||
assert.equal(forwarded.length, 0);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("embed WS proxy — dashboard login disabled", () => {
|
||||
before(async () => {
|
||||
await updateSettings({ requireLogin: false });
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a loopback upgrade from the dashboard origin is accepted, as on the HTTP embed route", async () => {
|
||||
const { status, forwarded } = await probe("127.0.0.1", { Origin: DASHBOARD_ORIGIN });
|
||||
assert.equal(status, 101);
|
||||
assert.equal(forwarded.length, 1);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a foreign Origin is still rejected", async () => {
|
||||
const { status, forwarded } = await probe("127.0.0.1", { Origin: FOREIGN_ORIGIN });
|
||||
assert.equal(status, 403);
|
||||
assert.equal(forwarded.length, 0);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a non-loopback peer is still rejected", async (t) => {
|
||||
const lan = lanAddress();
|
||||
if (!lan) {
|
||||
t.skip("no non-loopback IPv4 interface on this machine");
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
const { status, forwarded } = await probe(lan, { Origin: DASHBOARD_ORIGIN });
|
||||
assert.equal(status, 403);
|
||||
assert.equal(forwarded.length, 0);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -32,14 +32,11 @@ function allowedDeps(overrides: Record<string, unknown> = {}) {
|
||||
return {
|
||||
now: () => NOW,
|
||||
isValidApiKey: async (apiKey: string) => apiKey === "sk-allowed",
|
||||
// The panel key is explicitly granted the shared-account view; a plain
|
||||
// client key (self:usage only) is covered by the tests at the bottom.
|
||||
getApiKeyMetadata: async () => ({
|
||||
id: "key-allowed",
|
||||
name: "panel key",
|
||||
allowUsageCommand: true,
|
||||
usageLimitEnabled: true,
|
||||
scopes: ["self:usage", "self:account-quota"],
|
||||
}),
|
||||
getProviderConnections: async () => [
|
||||
{ id: "conn-claude", provider: "claude", isActive: true },
|
||||
@@ -226,75 +223,3 @@ test("om-usage preserves raw quota in json while text scales remaining quota by
|
||||
assert.match(text, /Weekly/);
|
||||
assert.match(text, /20% left/);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// A client key with the usage command could read, through ?format=json, every
|
||||
// shared provider account: connection ids, plan, raw quota and resets. Those
|
||||
// belong to the operator, not to the key holder.
|
||||
function failingProviderCollectors() {
|
||||
const fail = () => {
|
||||
throw new Error("provider accounts must not be read for this key");
|
||||
};
|
||||
return {
|
||||
getProviderConnections: async () => fail(),
|
||||
getAllProviderLimitsCache: () => fail(),
|
||||
getProviderConnectionById: async () => fail(),
|
||||
getProviderLimitsCache: () => fail(),
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for (const [label, scopes] of [
|
||||
["a plain client key (self:usage only)", ["self:usage"]],
|
||||
["a key whose metadata carries no scopes", undefined],
|
||||
] as const) {
|
||||
test(`om-usage ?format=json hides the shared provider accounts from ${label}`, async () => {
|
||||
const response = await handleInternalUsageCommandHttpRequest(
|
||||
new Request("http://localhost/api/usage/om-usage?format=json", {
|
||||
headers: { Authorization: "Bearer sk-allowed" },
|
||||
}),
|
||||
allowedDeps({
|
||||
getApiKeyMetadata: async () => ({
|
||||
id: "key-client",
|
||||
name: "client key",
|
||||
allowUsageCommand: true,
|
||||
usageLimitEnabled: true,
|
||||
...(scopes ? { scopes: [...scopes] } : {}),
|
||||
}),
|
||||
...failingProviderCollectors(),
|
||||
})
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
assert.equal(response.status, 200);
|
||||
const body = (await response.json()) as {
|
||||
allowed: boolean;
|
||||
personal: { weeklySpentUsd: number } | null;
|
||||
provider: unknown;
|
||||
providers: unknown[];
|
||||
};
|
||||
assert.equal(body.allowed, true);
|
||||
assert.equal(body.personal?.weeklySpentUsd, 8);
|
||||
assert.equal(body.provider, null);
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(body.providers, []);
|
||||
assert.doesNotMatch(JSON.stringify(body), /conn-claude|conn-codex|Claude Max|Codex Pro/);
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
test("om-usage ?format=json still shows the shared accounts to a management key", async () => {
|
||||
const response = await handleInternalUsageCommandHttpRequest(
|
||||
new Request("http://localhost/api/usage/om-usage?format=json", {
|
||||
headers: { Authorization: "Bearer sk-allowed" },
|
||||
}),
|
||||
allowedDeps({
|
||||
getApiKeyMetadata: async () => ({
|
||||
id: "key-admin",
|
||||
name: "operator key",
|
||||
allowUsageCommand: true,
|
||||
usageLimitEnabled: false,
|
||||
scopes: ["manage", "self:usage"],
|
||||
}),
|
||||
})
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
assert.equal(response.status, 200);
|
||||
const body = (await response.json()) as { providers: Array<{ provider: string }> };
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(body.providers.map((s) => s.provider).sort(), ["claude", "codex"]);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user