fix(security): clear the CodeQL alerts that redden every PR's quality ratchet on release/v3.8.54 (#19625)

The `check:codeql-ratchet` step in `Quality Ratchet` counts every open code-scanning alert in the repository. The baseline is 6 and the count is 8, so the job fails on every PR. This PR fixes the three alerts that no open PR covers yet. #19339 already covers the other five.

| Alert | Rule | Site | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| #1239 | `js/insufficient-password-hash` | `src/lib/db/agentSessions.ts:53` | `clientSessionRowId()` now uses `opaqueTokenFingerprint(..., { length: 32 })` (`open-sse/utils/opaqueTokenFingerprint.ts`, #16838). The input is an API key id plus a client session id, which is a lookup key, not a password. The bytes are identical to the old `sha256` hex prefix, so stored `as_…` ids keep matching. |
| #1237 | `js/insufficient-password-hash` | `src/lib/db/proxyTraffic.ts:57` | The legacy route key now uses `opaqueTokenFingerprint(tuple, { key: identitySalt })`. This is the same HMAC-SHA-256 under the private 256-bit per-database salt. The digest is a keyed identity key for the traffic metrics and is never compared to authenticate anything. The same database already keeps the proxy settings themselves (`proxy_registry`, the `proxyConfig` namespace), so a slow KDF would protect nothing. The bytes are identical, so persisted `legacy:…` rows keep matching. |
| #1238 | `js/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization` | `tests/unit/api-key-self-service-accounts.test.ts:205` | This is a masking leak check on an email label, not a URL, so `urlHost` does not apply. `masked.includ
This commit is contained in:
Diego Rodrigues de Sa e Souza
2026-11-10 04:50:44 -03:00
committed by GitHub
parent 8943ca6137
commit 6a49598e41
7 changed files with 76 additions and 10 deletions

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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
- **fix(security):** agent-session row ids and legacy proxy-traffic route keys are derived through `opaqueTokenFingerprint()`, and a test leak check no longer reads as a URL substring test, clearing CodeQL alerts #1237–#1239 that kept the `codeqlAlerts` ratchet red on every PR. Digests are byte-identical, so stored `as_…` sessions and `legacy:…` traffic rows keep matching ([#19625](https://github.com/cheaper-inference/OmniRoute/pull/19625))

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@@ -4,8 +4,9 @@
* always move together and dedup no-ops never double count.
*/
import { createHash, randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
import type { AgentContext } from "@omniroute/open-sse/handlers/chatCore/agentContext.ts";
import { opaqueTokenFingerprint } from "@omniroute/open-sse/utils/opaqueTokenFingerprint.ts";
import type { SqliteAdapter } from "./adapters/types";
@@ -49,10 +50,8 @@ function newSessionId(): string {
* by client session id looks rows up by this id, so changing it hides existing sessions there.
*/
function clientSessionRowId(apiKeyId: string | null, clientSessionId: string): string {
const digest = createHash("sha256")
.update(`${apiKeyId ?? ""}\x1f${clientSessionId}`)
.digest("hex");
return `as_${digest.slice(0, 32)}`;
// Same bytes as the historical sha256 hex prefix, so stored session ids keep matching.
return `as_${opaqueTokenFingerprint(`${apiKeyId ?? ""}\x1f${clientSessionId}`, { length: 32 })}`;
}
function findIdleWindowSession(db: SqliteAdapter, usage: AgentSessionUsage): string | null {

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@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
import { createHmac, randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
import { opaqueTokenFingerprint } from "@omniroute/open-sse/utils/opaqueTokenFingerprint.ts";
import { getDbInstance } from "./core";
import { getExistingDbInstance } from "./singleton";
import type { SqliteAdapter } from "./adapters/types";
@@ -53,9 +54,11 @@ export function trafficRoute(proxy: unknown, db: SqliteAdapter = getDbInstance()
}
const tuple = credentialTuple(proxy, value);
if (!tuple) return { key: "unattributed", proxyId: null, kind: "unattributed" };
const digest = createHmac("sha256", identitySalt(db))
.update(JSON.stringify(tuple), "utf8")
.digest("hex");
// Keyed identity fingerprint under the private 256-bit salt, never compared to authenticate
// anything; this database already keeps the proxy settings themselves (proxy_registry and the
// proxyConfig namespace). Same bytes as the historical HMAC-SHA-256 hex, so persisted
// `legacy:` rows keep matching.
const digest = opaqueTokenFingerprint(JSON.stringify(tuple), { key: identitySalt(db) });
return { key: `legacy:${digest}`, proxyId: null, kind: "legacy" };
}

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@@ -327,3 +327,30 @@ test("a write deferred by a database lock records the row and its session once,
// The lock is not reported as a failed session write that dropped the attribution.
assert.deepEqual(warnings, []);
});
test("client session row ids keep their persisted digest format (CodeQL #1239 migration)", () => {
// Vectors are the historical `as_` + sha256(apiKeyId \x1f clientSessionId)[0..32], computed once
// with node:crypto. The list filter looks sessions up by this id, so it must never drift.
const db = core.getDbInstance();
const usage = (apiKeyId: string | null) => ({
context: agentContext({ clientSessionId: "sess-pin", projectName: "pin" }),
apiKeyId,
apiKeyName: null,
timestamp: "2026-11-10T10:00:00.000Z",
success: true,
tokens: { input: 1, output: 1, cacheRead: 0, cacheCreation: 0, reasoning: 0 },
costUsd: 0,
priced: true,
provider: "openai",
model: "gpt-4o-mini",
connectionId: null,
});
const keyed = agentSessionsDb.recordAgentSessionUsage(db, usage("key-pin"));
assert.equal(keyed, "as_d70a21deaf1ed1a483a227ee1c2d7395");
assert.equal(agentSessionsDb.recordAgentSessionUsage(db, usage("key-pin")), keyed);
assert.equal(
agentSessionsDb.recordAgentSessionUsage(db, usage(null)),
"as_d2a4d57f0e77ac878eecd071ab88c4e4"
);
assert.equal(agentSessionsDb.getAgentSessionById(db, keyed)?.requestCount, 2);
});

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@@ -202,7 +202,8 @@ test("labels mask email-like account names and keep custom names", async () => {
const masked = labels.get("conn-a") ?? "";
assert.equal(masked.includes("john.doe"), false);
assert.equal(masked.includes("example.com"), false);
// Stricter than checking for the whole domain: no fragment of its name may survive the mask.
assert.equal(masked.includes("example"), false);
assert.match(masked, /^joh\*+@\*+com$/);
assert.equal(labels.get("conn-b"), "Team Codex");
const emailOnly = labels.get("conn-c") ?? "";

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@@ -91,6 +91,8 @@ const MIGRATED_FILES = [
"src/server/authz/entra/evaluate.ts",
"open-sse/executors/m365ImageGeneration.ts",
"open-sse/services/combo/handoffSessionScope.ts",
"src/lib/db/agentSessions.ts",
"src/lib/db/proxyTraffic.ts",
];
test("migrated call sites import the helper instead of hashing inline", () => {

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@@ -112,3 +112,36 @@ test(
}
}
);
test("legacy route keys keep their persisted HMAC format (CodeQL #1237 migration)", () => {
// Vectors are the historical HMAC-SHA-256(identitySalt, JSON tuple) hex, computed once with
// node:crypto. Persisted proxy_payload_traffic rows are keyed by them, so they must not drift.
const filename = path.join(fixtureDir, "fixture-pin.sqlite");
const db = createNodeSqliteAdapterFromDatabase(new DatabaseSync(filename), filename);
try {
db.exec(
"CREATE TABLE key_value (namespace TEXT, key TEXT, value TEXT, PRIMARY KEY(namespace,key));"
);
db.prepare(
"INSERT INTO key_value (namespace, key, value) VALUES ('proxyTraffic', 'identitySalt', ?)"
).run("5".repeat(64));
const proxy = {
type: "http",
host: "shared.invalid",
port: 8080,
username: "fixture-a",
password: "fixture-secret-a",
};
assert.deepEqual(trafficRoute(proxy, db), {
key: "legacy:acd1666b72da973db2fd28cd639398d4b6bd83a3cef793060fec68f09c262f4d",
proxyId: null,
kind: "legacy",
});
assert.equal(
trafficRoute("http://u-fixture:p-fixture@Pin.Invalid:3128/?x=1", db).key,
"legacy:f4e575eabde9ed49225f2e810307c60b30059ae1b3b12b1a31f3d05e5003150a"
);
} finally {
db.close();
}
});