Files
G0DM0D3/functions/api/telemetry.ts
faber 6b2cd9da5d fix: bounded streaming body read + update stale fallback comments
Replace request.text() with a streaming reader that cancels at
512 KiB — prevents a headerless or chunked-encoding request from
buffering an unbounded payload into Worker memory. No WAF rule
dependency.

Also updates the file header and wrangler.toml comments to
describe the current in-memory fallback (not the old direct-commit
behavior).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-11 07:33:30 -04:00

567 lines
19 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* G0DM0D3 Telemetry Proxy — Cloudflare Pages Function
*
* Receives metadata events from the frontend and buffers them in
* Cloudflare KV. When enough batches accumulate (or enough time
* passes), pending batches are flushed as JSONL commits to
* HuggingFace. This prevents the 10k+ commit buildup that
* happens with per-request commits.
*
* URL: POST /api/telemetry
*
* Setup (Cloudflare Pages Dashboard → Settings → Environment Variables):
* HF_TOKEN — HuggingFace write token (hf_...)
* HF_DATASET_REPO — Target dataset repo (e.g. "pliny-the-prompter/g0dm0d3")
* TELEMETRY_FLUSH_SECRET — Bearer token for authenticated cron flush
*
* KV Binding (Cloudflare Pages Dashboard → Settings → Bindings):
* TELEMETRY_KV — KV namespace for buffering
*
* Without TELEMETRY_KV bound, telemetry accumulates in an
* in-memory isolate buffer and flushes to HF in batches.
* KV is preferred (survives isolate eviction) but not required.
*
* Cloudflare-level protections (configure in Dashboard → Security):
* - WAF rule: block POST /api/telemetry with Content-Length > 524288
* - Rate limiting rule: 20 req/min per IP to /api/telemetry
* - Restrict Origin header to godmod3.ai (optional)
* - Monthly usage alert on Workers & KV (paid plan required at scale)
*/
interface Env {
HF_TOKEN: string
HF_DATASET_REPO: string
HF_DATASET_BRANCH?: string
TELEMETRY_KV?: KVNamespace
TELEMETRY_FLUSH_SECRET?: string
}
interface TelemetryEvent {
type: string
timestamp: number
session_id: string
[key: string]: unknown
}
interface TelemetryPayload {
events: TelemetryEvent[]
}
const HF_API = 'https://huggingface.co/api'
const CORS_HEADERS = {
'Access-Control-Allow-Origin': '*',
'Access-Control-Allow-Methods': 'POST, OPTIONS',
'Access-Control-Allow-Headers': 'Content-Type',
'Access-Control-Max-Age': '86400',
}
// ── Size & batching limits ──────────────────────────────────────────
// Workers have 128 MiB memory. Keep individual requests small and
// cap the total data loaded during a flush.
const MAX_REQUEST_BYTES = 512 * 1024 // 512 KiB per inbound POST
const MAX_BATCH_EVENTS = 100 // events per request
const FLUSH_BATCH_COUNT = 50 // keys before triggering flush
const FLUSH_MAX_KEYS = 50 // max keys consumed per flush cycle
const FLUSH_MAX_BYTES = 5 * 1024 * 1024 // 5 MiB combined JSONL per HF commit
const FLUSH_AGE_MS = 30 * 60 * 1000 // 30 minutes
// ── In-memory isolate buffer (fallback when KV not bound) ───────────
// Same persistence model as the rate limiter: module-level state
// survives across requests within the same Worker isolate. We
// accumulate JSONL lines and flush to HF when the buffer is large
// or old enough. Isolate eviction loses buffered data — acceptable
// for best-effort telemetry, not acceptable for the commit explosion.
const MEM_FLUSH_COUNT = 50 // events before flush
const MEM_FLUSH_BYTES = 256 * 1024 // 256 KiB before flush
const MEM_FLUSH_AGE_MS = 15 * 60 * 1000 // 15 minutes before flush
const MEM_MAX_BYTES = 2 * 1024 * 1024 // 2 MiB hard cap — drop oldest if exceeded
const memBuffer: string[] = []
let memBufferBytes = 0
let memBufferFirstTs = 0
// ── Rate Limiter (dual: session + IP, in-memory per-isolate) ────────
const RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS = 60_000
const RATE_LIMIT_MAX_SESSION = 10 // per session_id
const RATE_LIMIT_MAX_IP = 20 // per IP — catches session_id rotation
const rateLimitMap = new Map<string, number[]>()
function isRateLimited(key: string, max: number): boolean {
const now = Date.now()
let timestamps = rateLimitMap.get(key)
if (!timestamps) {
timestamps = []
rateLimitMap.set(key, timestamps)
}
const cutoff = now - RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS
while (timestamps.length > 0 && timestamps[0] <= cutoff) {
timestamps.shift()
}
if (timestamps.length >= max) {
return true
}
timestamps.push(now)
// Prevent unbounded memory growth across isolate lifetime
if (rateLimitMap.size > 10_000) {
const it = rateLimitMap.keys()
for (let i = 0; i < 1_000; i++) {
const k = it.next()
if (k.done) break
rateLimitMap.delete(k.value)
}
}
return false
}
function deriveSessionKey(event: TelemetryEvent): string {
const raw = JSON.stringify(event)
let h = 0
for (let i = 0; i < raw.length; i++) {
h = ((h << 5) - h + raw.charCodeAt(i)) | 0
}
return `__derived_${Math.abs(h).toString(36)}`
}
// ── Event Schema Validation ──────────────────────────────────────────
function validateEvent(event: unknown): event is TelemetryEvent {
if (typeof event !== 'object' || event === null || Array.isArray(event)) {
return false
}
const e = event as Record<string, unknown>
if (typeof e.type !== 'string' || e.type.length === 0) return false
if (typeof e.timestamp !== 'number' || !Number.isFinite(e.timestamp)) return false
if (typeof e.session_id !== 'string') return false
if (JSON.stringify(e).length > 65_536) return false
return true
}
// Handle CORS preflight
export const onRequestOptions: PagesFunction<Env> = async () => {
return new Response(null, { status: 204, headers: CORS_HEADERS })
}
// GET ?flush=force — authenticated cron trigger for guaranteed flush.
export const onRequestGet: PagesFunction<Env> = async (context) => {
const { request, env } = context
const url = new URL(request.url)
if (url.searchParams.get('flush') !== 'force') {
return new Response(null, { status: 204, headers: CORS_HEADERS })
}
if (!env.TELEMETRY_FLUSH_SECRET) {
return jsonResponse({ error: 'Flush not configured' }, 503)
}
const authHeader = request.headers.get('Authorization') || ''
const token = authHeader.replace(/^Bearer\s+/i, '')
if (!token || token !== env.TELEMETRY_FLUSH_SECRET) {
return jsonResponse({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, 401)
}
if (!env.TELEMETRY_KV || !env.HF_TOKEN || !env.HF_DATASET_REPO) {
return jsonResponse({ error: 'KV or HF not configured' }, 503)
}
const flushed = await flushKVToHF(env)
return jsonResponse({ flushed }, 200)
}
// Main handler
export const onRequestPost: PagesFunction<Env> = async (context) => {
const { request, env } = context
// ── Early size rejection (before reading body into memory) ────────
const contentLength = parseInt(request.headers.get('Content-Length') || '', 10)
if (contentLength > MAX_REQUEST_BYTES) {
return jsonResponse({ error: 'Request too large', limit: MAX_REQUEST_BYTES }, 413)
}
if (!env.HF_TOKEN || !env.HF_DATASET_REPO) {
const missing = []
if (!env.HF_TOKEN) missing.push('HF_TOKEN')
if (!env.HF_DATASET_REPO) missing.push('HF_DATASET_REPO')
console.error(`[Telemetry] Missing env vars: ${missing.join(', ')}`)
return jsonResponse({ error: `Telemetry not configured (missing: ${missing.join(', ')})` }, 503)
}
// ── IP-based rate limiting (catches session_id rotation attacks) ───
const clientIP = request.headers.get('CF-Connecting-IP') || request.headers.get('X-Forwarded-For') || 'unknown'
if (isRateLimited(`ip:${clientIP}`, RATE_LIMIT_MAX_IP)) {
return jsonResponse({ error: 'Rate limit exceeded — try again later' }, 429)
}
// ── Bounded body read (cancels stream at 512 KiB) ──────────────────
// Content-Length can be spoofed or absent (chunked), so we enforce
// the cap at the byte level while streaming — never buffer more than
// MAX_REQUEST_BYTES regardless of what the client claims.
let bodyText: string
try {
const reader = request.body?.getReader()
if (!reader) {
return jsonResponse({ error: 'No body' }, 400)
}
const chunks: Uint8Array[] = []
let totalBytes = 0
while (true) {
const { done, value } = await reader.read()
if (done) break
totalBytes += value.byteLength
if (totalBytes > MAX_REQUEST_BYTES) {
reader.cancel()
return jsonResponse({ error: 'Request too large', limit: MAX_REQUEST_BYTES }, 413)
}
chunks.push(value)
}
const merged = new Uint8Array(totalBytes)
let offset = 0
for (const c of chunks) { merged.set(c, offset); offset += c.byteLength }
bodyText = new TextDecoder().decode(merged)
} catch {
return jsonResponse({ error: 'Failed to read body' }, 400)
}
let payload: TelemetryPayload
try {
payload = JSON.parse(bodyText) as TelemetryPayload
} catch {
return jsonResponse({ error: 'Invalid JSON' }, 400)
}
if (!payload.events || !Array.isArray(payload.events) || payload.events.length === 0) {
return jsonResponse({ error: 'No events provided' }, 400)
}
const events = payload.events.slice(0, MAX_BATCH_EVENTS)
const invalid = events.filter(e => !validateEvent(e))
if (invalid.length > 0) {
return jsonResponse({ error: `${invalid.length} event(s) failed schema validation` }, 400)
}
// ── Session-based rate limiting ───────────────────────────────────
const firstEvent = events[0]
const sessionKey = firstEvent.session_id
? firstEvent.session_id
: deriveSessionKey(firstEvent)
if (isRateLimited(`session:${sessionKey}`, RATE_LIMIT_MAX_SESSION)) {
return jsonResponse({ error: 'Rate limit exceeded — try again later' }, 429)
}
const sanitized = events.map(stripPII)
const jsonl = sanitized.map(e => JSON.stringify(e)).join('\n')
// ── KV buffered path (preferred) ──────────────────────────────────
if (env.TELEMETRY_KV) {
const now = Date.now()
const kvKey = `batch:${now}:${shortHash(jsonl)}`
await env.TELEMETRY_KV.put(kvKey, jsonl, {
expirationTtl: 604800, // 7 days
})
// Check flush conditions
const pending = await env.TELEMETRY_KV.list({ prefix: 'batch:' })
const pendingCount = pending.keys.length
let shouldFlush = pendingCount >= FLUSH_BATCH_COUNT
if (!shouldFlush && pendingCount > 0) {
const oldestKey = pending.keys[0].name
const oldestTs = parseInt(oldestKey.split(':')[1], 10)
if (!isNaN(oldestTs) && (now - oldestTs) > FLUSH_AGE_MS) {
shouldFlush = true
}
}
if (shouldFlush) {
context.waitUntil(flushKVToHF(env))
}
return jsonResponse({
accepted: sanitized.length,
buffered: true,
pending: pendingCount,
flushing: shouldFlush,
}, 200)
}
// ── In-memory buffer fallback (KV not configured) ──────────────────
// Accumulates JSONL in the isolate's module scope and flushes to HF
// when the buffer is large or old enough. Zero config required.
// Data loss on isolate eviction is acceptable for telemetry.
const now = Date.now()
if (memBufferFirstTs === 0) memBufferFirstTs = now
// Drop oldest lines if hard cap would be exceeded
const lineBytes = new TextEncoder().encode(jsonl).byteLength
while (memBufferBytes + lineBytes > MEM_MAX_BYTES && memBuffer.length > 0) {
const dropped = memBuffer.shift()!
memBufferBytes -= new TextEncoder().encode(dropped).byteLength
}
memBuffer.push(jsonl)
memBufferBytes += lineBytes
const age = now - memBufferFirstTs
const shouldFlush =
memBuffer.length >= MEM_FLUSH_COUNT ||
memBufferBytes >= MEM_FLUSH_BYTES ||
age >= MEM_FLUSH_AGE_MS
if (shouldFlush) {
context.waitUntil(flushMemToHF(env))
}
return jsonResponse({
accepted: sanitized.length,
buffered: true,
pending: memBuffer.length,
flushing: shouldFlush,
storage: 'memory',
}, 200)
}
// ── KV Flush: read up to FLUSH_MAX_KEYS, cap at FLUSH_MAX_BYTES ────
async function flushKVToHF(env: Env): Promise<number> {
const kv = env.TELEMETRY_KV!
// Only list up to FLUSH_MAX_KEYS — leave the rest for the next cycle.
// This bounds both KV read ops and memory consumption.
const list = await kv.list({ prefix: 'batch:', limit: FLUSH_MAX_KEYS })
const keys = list.keys
if (keys.length === 0) return 0
// Read values with a cumulative size cap
const flushedKeys: { name: string }[] = []
const chunks: string[] = []
let totalBytes = 0
for (const key of keys) {
const value = await kv.get(key.name)
if (!value) {
flushedKeys.push(key) // empty key — still delete it
continue
}
const valueBytes = new TextEncoder().encode(value).byteLength
if (totalBytes + valueBytes > FLUSH_MAX_BYTES && chunks.length > 0) {
// Would exceed cap — stop here, remaining keys stay for next flush
break
}
chunks.push(value)
flushedKeys.push(key)
totalBytes += valueBytes
}
if (chunks.length === 0) {
// Only empty keys found — clean them up
if (flushedKeys.length > 0) {
await Promise.all(flushedKeys.map(key => kv.delete(key.name)))
}
return 0
}
const combined = chunks.join('\n')
const keyDigest = await sha256Hex(flushedKeys.map(k => k.name).sort().join(','))
const filePath = `telemetry/flush_${keyDigest}.jsonl`
const branch = env.HF_DATASET_BRANCH || 'main'
const ok = await commitToHF(env.HF_TOKEN, env.HF_DATASET_REPO, branch, filePath, combined)
if (ok) {
await Promise.all(flushedKeys.map(key => kv.delete(key.name)))
console.log(`[Telemetry] Flushed ${flushedKeys.length} batches (${(totalBytes / 1024).toFixed(0)} KiB) → ${filePath}`)
return flushedKeys.length
}
console.error(`[Telemetry] Flush failed — ${flushedKeys.length} batches remain in KV`)
return 0
}
// ── In-memory flush: drain buffer → one HF commit ──────────────────
async function flushMemToHF(env: Env): Promise<number> {
if (memBuffer.length === 0) return 0
// Snapshot and clear before the async commit so new requests
// accumulate into a fresh buffer, not into the one we're flushing.
const snapshot = memBuffer.splice(0, memBuffer.length)
const snapshotBytes = memBufferBytes
memBufferBytes = 0
memBufferFirstTs = 0
const combined = snapshot.join('\n')
const digest = await sha256Hex(combined)
const filePath = `telemetry/membuf_${digest}.jsonl`
const branch = env.HF_DATASET_BRANCH || 'main'
const ok = await commitToHF(env.HF_TOKEN, env.HF_DATASET_REPO, branch, filePath, combined)
if (ok) {
console.log(`[Telemetry] Memory flush: ${snapshot.length} batches (${(snapshotBytes / 1024).toFixed(0)} KiB) → ${filePath}`)
return snapshot.length
}
// Commit failed — push lines back so the next request retries.
// Prepend so ordering is roughly preserved.
memBuffer.unshift(...snapshot)
memBufferBytes += snapshotBytes
if (memBufferFirstTs === 0) memBufferFirstTs = Date.now()
console.error(`[Telemetry] Memory flush failed — ${snapshot.length} batches returned to buffer`)
return 0
}
// ── HuggingFace Hub Commit ───────────────────────────────────────────
async function commitToHF(
token: string,
repo: string,
branch: string,
filePath: string,
content: string,
): Promise<boolean> {
const url = `${HF_API}/datasets/${repo}/commit/${branch}`
const contentBase64 = utf8ToBase64(content)
const ndjson = [
JSON.stringify({ key: 'header', value: { summary: `[telemetry] ${filePath}` } }),
JSON.stringify({ key: 'file', value: { content: contentBase64, path: filePath, encoding: 'base64' } }),
].join('\n')
try {
const res = await fetch(url, {
method: 'POST',
headers: {
'Authorization': `Bearer ${token}`,
'Content-Type': 'application/x-ndjson',
},
body: ndjson,
})
if (!res.ok) {
const err = await res.text().catch(() => '')
if (res.status === 401 || res.status === 403) {
console.error(`[Telemetry] HF AUTH FAILED (${res.status}) — HF_TOKEN is invalid or lacks write access to "${repo}"`)
} else if (res.status === 404) {
console.error(`[Telemetry] HF REPO NOT FOUND (404) — "${repo}" does not exist on HuggingFace`)
} else {
console.error(`[Telemetry] HF commit failed (${res.status}): ${err.slice(0, 300)}`)
}
}
return res.ok
} catch (err) {
console.error(`[Telemetry] Network error:`, err)
return false
}
}
// ── Helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
const ALLOWED_FIELDS = new Set<string>([
// Core envelope
'type', 'timestamp', 'session_id',
// Shared model/perf
'mode', 'model', 'duration_ms', 'response_length', 'success', 'error_type',
// Pipeline config
'pipeline', 'stm_modules', 'strategy', 'godmode', 'auto_retry',
'improve_mode', 'liquid_mode',
// AutoTune
'autotune', 'detected_context', 'confidence',
'autotune_context', 'autotune_confidence',
// Parseltongue
'parseltongue', 'triggers_found', 'technique', 'intensity',
'parseltongue_transform', 'parseltongue_transformed',
'encoding', 'encoding_rounds',
// ULTRAPLINIAN race
'ultraplinian', 'tier', 'models_queried', 'models_succeeded', 'models_refused',
'early_stop', 'early_threshold', 'winner_model', 'winner_score',
'winner_content_length', 'winner_duration_ms', 'winner_template',
'total_duration_ms', 'judge_model', 'model_results', 'all_scores',
'winner_combo', 'winner_source', 'race_result',
'combo', 'combos_attempted', 'combos_failed', 'combos_succeeded',
// Standard completion
'attempts', 'content_length', 'temperature', 'top_p',
'fallback_reason',
// Streaming / liquid
'stream', 'fast_stream', 'has_image',
'liquid_upgraded', 'liquid_upgrades',
// Harm classification
'classification',
// Structural context
'persona', 'prompt_length', 'conversation_depth', 'memory_count',
'no_log',
])
function stripPII(event: TelemetryEvent): TelemetryEvent {
const clean: Record<string, unknown> = {}
for (const key of Object.keys(event)) {
if (ALLOWED_FIELDS.has(key)) {
clean[key] = event[key]
}
}
return clean as TelemetryEvent
}
function shortHash(str: string): string {
let h = 0
for (let i = 0; i < str.length; i++) {
h = ((h << 5) - h + str.charCodeAt(i)) | 0
}
return Math.abs(h).toString(36).slice(0, 6)
}
async function sha256Hex(str: string): Promise<string> {
const data = new TextEncoder().encode(str)
const buf = await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', data)
return [...new Uint8Array(buf)].map(b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('')
}
// Chunked UTF-8-safe base64: processes 32 KiB at a time to avoid
// creating a single enormous string via Array.from() on the full input.
function utf8ToBase64(content: string): string {
const bytes = new TextEncoder().encode(content)
const CHUNK = 32 * 1024
let binStr = ''
for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i += CHUNK) {
const slice = bytes.subarray(i, Math.min(i + CHUNK, bytes.length))
for (let j = 0; j < slice.length; j++) {
binStr += String.fromCharCode(slice[j])
}
}
return btoa(binStr)
}
function jsonResponse(data: unknown, status: number): Response {
return new Response(JSON.stringify(data), {
status,
headers: {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
...CORS_HEADERS,
},
})
}